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In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about
what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that
characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about
how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of
challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require abnormal
experience alone, or also reasoning biases or deficits? We hope to show that the focus on delusions has
made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of the mind and continues to raise issues that are central
to defining the concept of belief and gaining a better understanding of how people process information
and learn about the world.
1. Introduction
In this paper we shall offer an overview of two lively debates in the philosophical and empirical
literature on delusions. First, we focus on the debate about what delusions are. Then, we turn to
the debate about how delusions develop. The two debates are interrelated: fundamental issues
about the nature of delusions are ref lected in the search for a theory about how delusions de-
velop. Considerations about the nature and development of delusions start from a ref lection
on clinical cases in psychiatry and empirical work in cognitive neuroscience, and inform a
broader theoretical understanding of how the mindworks, what its limitations are and how per-
ceptual, cognitive and affective states interact.
In the literature we review in this paper, the term ‘delusion’ refers to a clinical phenomenon,
and in particular to an observable symptom of schizophrenia, delusional disorders, dementia,
amnesia and other psychiatric disorders. In the most recent version of theDiagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), delusion is defined as follows:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is ﬁrmly held despite what almost
everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to
the contrary. The belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subcul-
ture (i.e., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is
regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility (American Psychiatric
Association).
The definition has been challenged on various grounds (Coltheart), but it remains a useful
diagnostic tool for clinicians.
Examples of delusions are persecution, where the person reports that other people are hostile
and intend to cause her harm, and jealousy, where the person reports that her romantic partner
is being unfaithful to her. More bizarre delusions include mirrored-self misidentification, where the© 2015 The Authors.
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Delusions 637person reports that there is a stranger in the mirror, or the Cotard delusion, where the person
reports that she is dead or disembodied. Despite differences in content, delusions have similar
characteristics, and they all tend to be maintained in the face of counter-evidence and
counter-argument. We shall consider some features of delusions in more detail in the next
section.
2. The Nature of Delusions
In this section, we shall review two approaches to the nature of delusions. The first approach is
to regard delusions as beliefs (doxasticism). Doxasticists agree that delusions are beliefs (Bortolotti;
Bayne and Pacherie; Miyazono and Bortolotti; Reimer), but they may disagree on whether de-
lusions are rational or irrational beliefs, and about whether they are continuous with or categorically
different from non-delusional beliefs.
The second approach is to regard delusions as something other than beliefs (anti-doxasticism).
Anti-doxasticists agree that characterising delusions as beliefs is unsatisfactory, but they disagree
on the positive account that best captures the nature of delusions. Although some argue that de-
lusions are empty utterances with no meaning (Berrios), most anti-doxasticists defend the view
that delusions are mental states of a non-doxastic or a non-exclusively-doxastic nature: acts of
imagination (Currie and Ravenscroft; Currie and Jureidini), perceptual inferences (Hohwy
and Rajan), states in-between beliefs and non-beliefs (Schwitzgebel; Tumulty), states in-
between beliefs and desires or in-between beliefs and imaginings (Egan), attitudes towards men-
tal states (Stephens and Graham), acceptances (Frankish) or thoughts expressing the content of
default processes (Gerrans).
Here we shall present some arguments for and against the claim that delusions are best under-
stood as beliefs. In particular, we shall argue that, if we adopt a psychologically realistic view of
the relationship between beliefs and evidence, and acknowledge the role that affective and mo-
tivational states play in driving action, anti-doxasticism can be resisted.2.1. RESPONSIVENESS TO EVIDENCE
Here is a common argument against the doxastic nature of delusions, the ‘argument from
responsiveness to evidence’:
(R1) It is a constitutive feature of beliefs that they are responsive to evidence.
(R2) Delusions are not responsive to evidence.
(R3) Therefore, delusions are not beliefs.
To evaluate this argument we need to consider the plausibility of (R1) and (R2).
Let us start with (R2). Are delusions responsive to evidence? Some definitions of delusions
point to resistance to counter-evidence as the main feature of delusions (Gilleen and David).
This feature is also an important diagnostic criterion for delusions. According to DSM-5, delu-
sions are ‘fixed beliefs’. It would be unwise to claim that all delusions are equally impervious to
revision, but empirical evidence speaks in favour of the view that most delusions are not respon-
sive to counter-evidence. For instance, in one striking case of the Cotard delusion (the delusion
that one is dead or disembodied), a young woman continued to hold that she was dead, even
after she acknowledged that dead people do not usually move and talk, and that she did move
and talk (McKay and Cipolotti). In another powerful case report, a woman with erotomania
(the delusion that one is loved by another, usually a stranger) continued to believe that a man
was in love with her and intended to propose to her, even after she talked to him on the phone
and he told her that he was not in love with her and could barely remember who she was© 2015 The Authors.
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evidence though. People tend to argue for the content of their delusions when they encounter
challenges. Moreover, the conviction in the delusions may f luctuate, and sometimes it does so
as a result of experience, ref lection or external challenges.
Let us consider (R1) now. Do beliefs need to be responsive to evidence? There are several
philosophical and psychological accounts of what constitutes a belief, but there is very little
agreement on the necessary and sufficient conditions for belief. Thus it is hard to argue for or
against the doxastic nature of delusions on the basis of what we take beliefs to be.Many accounts
converge on the fact that responsiveness to evidence is a key feature of beliefs, a feature that, for
instance, distinguishes beliefs from acts of imagination or wishful thinking. But it is debatable
whether responsiveness to evidence is a criterion for belief or, rather, an ideal to which rational
beliefs aspire. We seem to categorise some attitudes as beliefs even if they are not responsive to
evidence. In some circumstances, we form beliefs, and uphold them, independently of whether
there is evidence supporting them. In other circumstances, we form beliefs based on evidence,
but we do not easily update them or reject them when counter-evidence emerges. Examples
include prejudiced, superstitious and religious beliefs (Brewster and Rusche), beliefs in scientific
theories we are committed to (Chinn and Brewer) and beliefs about ourselves in general, in-
cluding beliefs about our traits, talents, weaknesses and ideological convictions (Markus;
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Holt).
Thus, the argument from responsiveness to evidence does not seem to be conclusive as an
argument against the doxastic nature of delusions. Doxasticists may respond to the argument
by acknowledging that delusions tend to be resistant to counter-evidence, but pointing out that
other instances of belief do so too. This puts pressure on anti-doxasticists to either provide ad-
ditional reasons to doubt the doxastic nature of delusion or conclude that other attitudes com-
monly described as beliefs are not genuine instances of beliefs because of their resistance to
counter-evidence. Anti-doxasticists can respond to this challenge, but here we shall not exam-
ine the debate further.2.2. ACTION GUIDANCE
Another common argument against doxasticism is the ‘argument from action guidance’:
(G1) It is a constitutive feature of beliefs that they guide action.
(G2) Delusions do not guide action.
(G3) Therefore, delusions are not beliefs.
To evaluate this argument we need to consider the plausibility of (G1) and (G2).
Let us start with (G2). Do delusions really fail to guide action? It is a diagnostic criterion for
delusions that they lead to action, and thus it is implausible to claim that delusions generally fail to
guide action. People have been known to engage in risky behaviours, stop contacting their fam-
ilies, move cities, abandon their studies and change jobs as a result of their delusions. But some
philosophers have commented on the phenomenon of double bookkeeping that seems to apply to
at least some delusions. Double bookkeeping refers to the presence of conf licting commitments
within an agent and is usually exemplified by people who make verbal reports that are not
ref lected in their behaviour. For instance, in two classic examples, a woman claims to be the
queen but does not behave like royalty (Bleuler), and a man claims that the nurses in the hospital
want to poison him but eats the food they give him (Gallagher). In such circumstances it is
legitimate to ask whether the woman genuinely believes she is the queen, and whether the
man is serious in his allegations against the hospital nurses.© 2015 The Authors.
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ness to evidence, it may help us distinguish beliefs from other attitudes. Believing that an un-
tamed lion is in the room may lead us to run away, whilst imagining a lion in the room may
not have the same effect. That said, as with responsiveness to evidence, not all beliefs share
the same action-guiding potential. Some beliefs have a direct impact on behaviour and some
do not. Some beliefs are acted on in some circumstances and not in others. The psychological
literature on everyday hypocrisy shows that cases of double bookkeeping are by no means con-
fined to delusions.
One important consideration is the role played by motivation in turning beliefs into actions.
Even the most strongly held belief may not be acted on if independent factors inhibit motiva-
tion, such as the agent lacking confidence, fearing a sanction or missing the opportunity to act.
In the psychiatric disorders characterised by delusions, and especially in schizophrenia, motiva-
tion is negatively affected. This might mean that genuine beliefs can generate the appropriate
intentions, but fail to play their action-guiding role if such intentions are not carried out and
converted into action. This phenomenon provides some explanation for the apparent lack of
commitment to some delusional states observed in the literature on double bookkeeping
(Bortolotti and Broome).2.3. REVISIONISM OR CONSERVATISM ABOUT BELIEF
The arguments discussed in the previous sections may not be convincing on their own, but they
have been powerfully combined in the work of some inf luential anti-doxasticists. If delusions
fail to be responsive to evidence and they also fail to guide action in the relevant circumstances,
one may deny that they have the same causal roles as beliefs and wonder whether it is helpful to
regard them as beliefs at all.
In light of this discussion, two options emerge. Revisionism recommends that we should
change our terminology. We should call ‘beliefs’ only those attitudes that are responsive to
evidence and guide action (i.e. that play the causal roles of beliefs), and find some other term
to refer to those attitudes that share many of the features of beliefs, but are less responsive to
evidence and less inf luential on action than typical beliefs. Authors who pursue this strategy
in different ways include Greg Currie, Keith Frankish, Dominic Murphy, Eric Schwitzgebel
and Andy Egan. The worry with this particular revisionist strategy is that it does not necessarily
lead to a philosophy of belief that is more compatible with the psychological science or our
everyday experience of believers. Instead, it is an attempt to preserve an idealised notion of belief
that applies only to attitudes conforming to norms of rationality for beliefs. If followed through,
this move would make the category of belief much less populated.
Conservatism recommends that we should not change our terminology and that we continue
to use the term ‘belief’ quite liberally. The category of belief needs to be demarcated somehow,
and it cannot be stretched to encompass those attitudes entirely lacking impact on behaviour or
sensitivity to evidence. But it should not be required of all attitudes to be responsive to evidence
and to be action-guiding to count as beliefs. Those who are conservative about the notion of
belief have no reason to doubt the doxastic nature of delusions. Just like other attitudes that
can be resistant to evidence or that fail to guide action, delusional states can count as beliefs.
After all, ascribing delusions often serves the same purpose as ascribing beliefs: it allows agents
to predict and understand other agents’ behaviour, coordinate and cooperate.
Revisionism and conservatism can be both plausibly defended, and the budding literature on
the topic shows that philosophers can make sense of many features of delusions independently
of what strategy they opt for. One thing that cannot be ignored is that, whether we regard de-
lusions as beliefs or as something else, many of their epistemic features are shared by attitudes that© 2015 The Authors.
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and abnormal cognition.
3. The Development of Delusions
In this section, we shall review two approaches to the development of delusions (i.e. the forma-
tion and maintenance of delusions) that are popular in the empirical literature: two-factor
accounts and prediction-error accounts. We shall suggest that, despite being usually presented
as incompatible, the two approaches can be integrated.3.1. TWO-FACTOR THEORIES
Two-factor theories (Coltheart; Coltheart, Langdon, and McKay; Davies et al.) are very inf lu-
ential, especially as accounts of monothematic delusions (i.e. delusions concerning a
single theme). The Capgras delusion is the most extensively discussed example. In the Capgras
delusion the person comes to believe that a loved one has been replaced by an identical, or al-
most identical, impostor. Ellis and Young argue that the Capgras delusion is formed in response
to an abnormal perceptual-affective experience of seeing familiar faces. It is known that normal
individuals exhibit stronger autonomic responses when perceiving a familiar face than when
perceiving an unfamiliar face. However, the asymmetry in autonomic responses is missing in
people with the Capgras delusion (Ellis et al.). When seeing familiar faces and having the abnor-
mal experience people ‘adopt some sort of rationalisation strategy in which the individual before
them is deemed to be an imposter, a dummy, a robot, or whatever extant technology may sug-
gest’ (Ellis and Young 244).
Is the abnormal perceptual-affective experience causally sufficient for the development of the
Capgras delusion? Someone who is sympathetic to Maher’s famous claim that ‘a delusion is a
hypothesis designed to explain unusual perceptual phenomena and developed through the
operation of normal cognitive processes’ (Maher 103) might think that it is causally sufficient.
Two-factor theorists, however, do not think that the abnormal experience is sufficient for
the development of the Capgras delusion. In addition to the abnormal experience (the
first factor) there has to be an additional factor. The main argument for the second factor goes
as follows: just like people with the Capgras delusion, people with damage to the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) fail to show the asymmetrical autonomic responses between familiar
and unfamiliar faces (Tranel, Damasio, and Damasio), which suggests that people with the
Capgras delusion and with vmPFC damage have a similar abnormal experience. However, peo-
ple with vmPFC damage do not develop the Capgras delusion. The best explanation of this is
that the abnormal experience is not sufficient for the development of the Capgras delusion, and
the second factor explains why people with vmPFC damage do not necessarily develop the
Capgras delusion. Similar arguments about other monothematic delusions have been presented
(Coltheart; Davies et al.). Thus, one fundamental commitment of two-factor theories is that
there are two factors contributing to the development of delusions. The two factors are disso-
ciable from each other (i.e. one can exist without the other), and the first factor is not causally
sufficient for the development of delusions.
There is no consensus about the nature of the two factors, but it is widely assumed that the
two factors play different explanatory roles. In particular, the first factor explains the content of
the delusion, whilst the second factor explains the development of the delusion. More precisely,
the second factor explains either why the delusion is formed and maintained (e.g. Stone and
Young; McKay) or only why the delusion is maintained (e.g. Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton).
The main disagreement among different versions of the two-factor theory concerns the
nature of the second factor. Stone and Young as well as McKay argue that the inferential step© 2015 The Authors.
Philosophy Compass Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Philosophy Compass 10/9 (2015): 636–645, 10.1111/phc3.12249
Delusions 641from the first factor (e.g. an abnormal perceptual-affective experience of seeing familiar faces) to
the delusional belief (e.g. ‘this woman is not my wife’) involves biased reasoning. According to
their version of the two-factor theory, the reasoning bias is the second factor. Coltheart,
Menzies, and Sutton, on the other hand, claim that the inferential step from the first factor to
the delusional belief is perfectly rational from a Bayesian point of view. According to their ver-
sion of the two-factor theory, the second factor is not a reasoning bias but rather the unreason-
able maintenance of delusions despite overwhelming counter-evidence.3.2. PREDICTION-ERROR THEORIES
Prediction-error theories (Adams et al.; Clark; Corlett, Murray, et al.; Corlett, Taylor, et al.;
Fletcher and Frith; Hohwy) are emerging theories that are primarily aimed at explaining delu-
sions in schizophrenia. The fundamental idea of prediction-error theories is that delusions are
the product of the abnormalities in the belief-updating processes driven by prediction errors.
A prediction error is, in general, the mismatch between an expectation and an actual input. A
remarkable study (Corlett, Murray, et al.) suggests that prediction-error signalling is abnormal in
people with delusions in the context of schizophrenia. In the study, two groups of subjects, peo-
ple with delusions due to schizophrenia and non-clinical controls, were tested in a task involving
learning and predicting the association between certain foods and allergic reactions to them.
The activity of the right prefrontal cortex (rPFC) (that had been identified as a reliable marker
of prediction-error processing in previous studies) was monitored with fMRI. Results showed
that, in the control group, the rPFC activity was much greater in the cases where their
predictions were disconfirmed than in the cases where they were confirmed, as if the brain
was ‘surprised’ when the predictions were disconfirmed but not when they were confirmed.
In the delusional group, the asymmetry in the rPFC activity was diminished, as if the brain
was ‘surprised’ not only when the predictions were disconfirmed but also when they were
confirmed.
The prediction-error theory relies on the predictive-processing framework for understanding
brain and mind ( for reviews, see Clark; Friston; Hohwy). The framework has the following
core assumptions. First, the brain tries to minimise prediction errors, often (but not always) by
updating expectations in a Bayesian manner on the basis of prior expectations and actual inputs.
Second, prediction-error minimisation processes occur in many different but interrelated levels
of the processing hierarchy within the brain. Different levels deal with information at different
degrees of abstractness (e.g. sentences, words, letters and shapes). A prediction error at the lower
level becomes an input for the higher level, and, at the same time, feedback from the higher
level becomes an expectation at the lower level. Third, not all prediction errors are processed
in the same way. The brain is sensitive to precision, that is, the indicator of the reliability or trust-
worthiness of prediction errors. Precise prediction errors are weighted more strongly in the
hierarchical processing than imprecise prediction errors.
In this framework, belief updating is just a process of prediction-error minimising at some
levels (presumably, some higher levels) of the hierarchy. A consequence of this view is that de-
lusions might be conceptualised as the product of abnormalities in the belief-updating processes
that are driven by prediction errors. But what is the nature of these abnormalities? A popular
view is that they involve the failure to estimate the precision of sensory prediction errors. For
instance, some sensory prediction errors that would usually be ignored are regarded as extremely
precise, and thus they propagate upward in the hierarchy causing a revision of prior beliefs. This
seems to fit nicely with what we know about the way in which delusions in schizophrenia are
typically formed. In the prodromal phase of schizophrenia (i.e. the early stage before the onset of
specific symptoms), random events that would be usually ignored become salient (Kapur). They© 2015 The Authors.
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be drawn to the pattern of the colours of the doors on a street and wonder if there is a reason for
the pattern. The delusional belief, say, that the pattern conveys a secret message from an un-
known organisation, is accepted as the explanation of the abnormally salient event.
The main disagreement among different versions of the prediction-error theory concerns the
nature of the abnormality in the belief-updating processes driven by prediction errors. The
abnormality might involve the bottom-up revision of prior (non-delusional) beliefs due to
the presence of highly precise sensory prediction errors (Adams et al.; Fletcher and Frith; Frith
and Friston). This version of the prediction-error theory nicely explains the process by which
delusions are formed. Alternatively, the abnormality might involve the heavy reliance on
top-down (delusional) prior beliefs due to imprecise sensory prediction errors (Hohwy). This
version of the prediction-error theory nicely explains the process by which delusions are
maintained despite overwhelming counter-evidence.3.3. HOW DO THE TWO APPROACHES RELATE TO EACH OTHER?
Each of the approaches we described, the two-factor theory and the prediction-error theory, has
some unresolved issues. As we noted, an unresolved issue for two-factor theorists is the elusive
nature of the second factor. An unresolved issue for prediction-error theorists is the nature of the
abnormality in prediction-error processing.
In addition to those issues that are internal to each approach, there are unresolved issues
concerning the relation between the two approaches. It seems as though both two-factor
theories and prediction-error theories have a significant degree of theoretical and empirical
plausibility. But how do they relate to one another? One view is that the two approaches do
not share target phenomena in the first place. For example, one could argue that two-factor
theories explain the development of monothematic delusions, and prediction-error theories
explain the development of delusions in schizophrenia. This view, however, is not fully satisfac-
tory because ‘monothematic delusions’ and ‘delusions in schizophrenia’ are not exclusive
categories and can overlap. For instance, the Capgras delusion is a typical monothematic
delusion, but it can also be found in the context of schizophrenia.
Another view is that the two approaches are incompatible and at least one of them is false.
Prediction-error theorists tend to hold this incompatibilist view. For instance, Corlett and
colleagues argue that, if their account is correct, then there is no need for two distinct factors
becausea single deﬁcit in Bayesian inference is able to explain more of what we know about the interactions
between perception and belief-based expectation, the neurobiology of the delusions that occur in
schizophrenia and the maintenance of delusions in the face of contradictory evidence (Corlett, Taylor,
et al. 357).
But it is far from obvious that they can provide a plausible account of the asymmetry between
people with the Capgras delusion and people with vmPFC damage without positing two sep-
arate factors.
A third view is that the two approaches are compatible and are correct (or, at least, some core
ideas of both approaches are correct). This view seems to be more attractive than the competing
views since it allows for the possibility of a hybrid account. The hope is that the hybrid account
can inherit the theoretical and empirical plausibility of the two approaches and overcome the
problems that the individual approaches still seem to have.© 2015 The Authors.
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ing to one compatibilist scenario that could be articulated within a two-factor theory approach,
the first factor explaining the content of the delusion is related to prediction errors. For example,
one might think that the first factor of the Capgras delusion is the mismatch between expected
and actual affective responses to familiar faces (Coltheart, Langdon, and McKay). According to
another compatibilist scenario that could also be pursued within a two-factor theory approach,
the second factor responsible for the development of the delusion is explained by prediction er-
rors. For example, the inappropriately high precision of sensory prediction errors might be re-
sponsible for the bias that leads people with delusions to prioritise new observations over
existing beliefs (McKay; Frith and Friston).4. Concluding Remarks
The recent debates on the nature, formation and maintenance of delusions ref lect interesting
developments in the philosophy of mind broadly conceived. One question is whether we
should hold on to our current folk-psychological vocabulary or attempt to replace it with a
new vocabulary driven by more sophisticated epistemological distinctions among the causal
roles of various attitudes that we currently identify as beliefs. Another question is whether we
should hold on to the distinction between experience and reasoning when we think about
how we represent the world, or rather conceive of our minds and brains as prediction-error
minimising machines that process information at different levels of abstraction to conjure an
overall model of the world that is constantly updated. Here we sketched a map of possibilities
and suggested some promising ways forward.Acknowledgement
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